2a: Defending Our Definition

It might seem obvious that such a position—that to be a member of the species is sufficient to be a person—is the cornerstone of modern Liberaldom, with its conception of human rights and equal protection. Indeed, some of the most embarrassing and universally repudiated episodes¹ in Western cultural memory have resulted precisely because one group of humans tried to exclude another group of humans from its conception of person. We like to think we’ve put those attitudes behind us. Nevertheless, in their efforts to salvage abortion from intellectual ruin, some pro-choicers are willing to dispense with this standard definition of person in favor of a more restrictive one. As usual, we’re required to go into more detail.

A positive defense² of the pro-life understanding of person is possible but involves some heavy philosophy. A dialectical defense, which seeks instead to show that the major alternative options are inadequate, is easier to understand. In the following, we will assume we can all agree that (born) babies are persons, possessors of basic human rights who may not be treated instrumentally.

The question of personhood in the context of the abortion debate often centers around where to draw the line to mark the beginning. We would argue, however, that it is more helpful to frame it as a question concerning the minimum set of characteristics³ sufficient to make an entity a person. This is because a beginning boundary, in order not to be completely arbitrary, must herald the onset of some characteristic necessary for personhood, such as being human or an organism.

Most people agree that being human and being a living being are necessary ingredients of personhood. Furthermore, we have already seen that human organisms come to be at fertilization. Therefore, if these are the only two conditions necessary for personhood (as pro-lifers claim), then personhood must begin at conception. A pro-choicer who denies this must propose a third property to add to the set of minimum sufficient conditions. In order for the pro-choicer’s understanding to justify some or all abortions, the third property must appear at some point after a human organism is first present.